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It is becoming ever more accepted that investigations of mind span the brain, body, and
environment. To broaden the scope of what is relevant in such investigations is to increase
the amount of data scientists must reckon with. Thus, a major challenge facing scientists
who study the mind is how to make big data intelligible both within and between fields.
One way to face this challenge is to structure the data within a framework and to make it
intelligible by means of a common theory. Radical embodied cognitive neuroscience can
function as such a framework, with dynamical systems theory as its methodology, and
self-organized criticality as its theory.
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INTRODUCTION
The National Science Foundation recently identified “grand chal-
lenges” in brain mapping (National Science Foundation, 2013).
One of the grand challenges in understanding the brain is the
need for a common theoretical language for describing the brain
across multiple scales of inquiry (He et al., 2013). A related
grand challenge is the need to reduce “Big Data” to “Small Data”
(He et al., 2013). The call for a common theoretical language
across scales and for data reduction are responses to the massive
amounts of data being produced. Government-funded projects
such as the BRAIN Initiative (National Institutes of Health, 2014)
and theHuman Brain Project (European Commission, 2013) pro-
duce enormous amounts of data related to brain structure and
function. The creation of an ultrahigh-resolution 3-D model of
a single human brain, for example, is speculated to result in
about 21,000 terabytes of data (Amunts et al., 2013). The field
of neuroscience is starting to experience information overload
(Gallagher and Appenzeller, 1999). I refer to this as the “data
deluge challenge.”
It should come as no surprise that neuroscience could be
reaching a time when it is generating more data than it can
handle. Signs of the data deluge challenge date at least as far
back as the early 1990s, when neuroscience was described as
“data rich, but theory poor” (Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992,
p. 16). Neuroscience is now in “urgent need” (Sporns, 2011a) of
a common theoretical language and solid theoretical foundation
if the accumulated data is to facilitate understanding of the brain,
cognition, and behavior.
With the increasing acceptance that investigations of mind
span the brain, body, and environment, the grand challenges of
identifying a common theoretical language and the urgent need
for a solid theoretical foundation are no longer confined solely
to neuroscience. Moreover, by accepting that mind spans brain,
body, and environment, the other grand challenge of reduc-
ing big data to small data potentially becomes one of reducing
enormous data to small data. These two grand challenges are
made far more challenging when they are no longer confined
to one scientific field of inquiry, but span multiple fields. Can
a cognitive scientist incorporate her motion-capture data with a
neuroscientist’s connectome data, and can a psychologist incor-
porate those data in her studies of social networks? One way to
face these challenges is to structure the data within a framework
and to make it intelligible by means of an underlying theory.
Radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) can function as
such a framework and self-organized criticality (SOC) can be the
theory.
In responding to the data deluge challenge, I begin with a
description of a version of radical embodied cognitive neuro-
science. Second, I discuss SOC. Next, I present an early attempt
at applying RECN across various scales of inquiry. Last, I dis-
cuss how the framework and theory can be utilized to address the
NSF’s grand challenges.
THE FRAMEWORK: RADICAL EMBODIED COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
THE INSPIRATION: RADICAL EMBODIED COGNITIVE SCIENCE
The version of RECN that I propose is inspired by Chemero’s rad-
ical embodied cognitive science (RECS) (2009, 2013). Chemero
places his RECS in a lineage of modern psychology that orig-
inates in Darwinism, Jamesian functionalism, and Gibsonian
ecological psychology (Chemero, 2013). The two main features
of Chemero’s RECS that are most pertinent to RECN are that it
takes ecological psychology as the starting point for its theoretical
basis and dynamical systems theory (DST) as its methodology.
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Gibson’s ecological psychology (1966/1979) contrasts with
more mainstream cognitive science and psychology in its inves-
tigation of “perceptual systems” (Gibson, 1973/1983) and the
underlying commitments that frame these investigations (cf.
Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981; Turvey et al., 1981). Ecological
psychologists generally agree that perception is for guiding
action and is direct in that the relation between the organ-
ism and environment is unmediated by mental representations.
Instead of indirect, mental representations, perception is of affor-
dances, which are directly perceivable opportunities for action
(Richardson et al., 2008; Chemero, 2009). In order to inves-
tigate organism-environment systems, ecological psychologists
often utilize DST (e.g., Kugler et al., 1980). Much research con-
sistent with and part of the ecological tradition often involves
modeling changes over time in the perception-action cycle of
perceptual systems (e.g., Smith and Thelen, 2003). DST utilizes
methods from calculus to capture changes of variables over time
within a system. What counts as a “system” is not limited to the
skin, scales, feathers, or fur boundaries of an organism. A system
can be comprised of an organism-environment and their inter-
actions (Beer, 1995; van Gelder, 1995). Taken together, ecological
psychology and DST are the core of Chemero’s RECS, and pro-
vide him with a background theory and methodology. This brief
summary of RECS is intended to serve as the launching point for
my description of RECN. In the next two sections I present RECN
by comparing and contrasting it with RECS.
THE “RADICAL,” THE “EMBODIED,” AND THE “COGNITIVE”
In the currently proposed version of RECN, “radical” refers
to the rejection of the “mind as computer” metaphor and
the central role of mental representations in guiding actions.
“Embodied” refers to the non-brain-centric treatment of cogni-
tion. “Cognitive” refers to the target of investigation within this
framework. Like RECS (Chemero, 2009, 2013), RECN’s use of
“cognition” is consistent with the Jamesian functionalist tradi-
tion, which treats cognition in terms of meaningful, systematic,
often goal-directed, behavior. This loose definition is in no way
intended to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions of
cognition. Adherents to the commitments of mainstream cog-
nitive science and psychology will not find their “holy grail”
here, namely, the mark of the cognitive (cf. Adams and Aizawa,
2008; Menary, 2010). This sense of cognition is more in-line with
“mindedness,” whereby cognition begins with perceptual capac-
ities that guide action, and is always involved in an organism’s
being-in-the-world (cf. Thompson, 2007; Anderson, 2009). This
shift from a Cartesian notion of cognition as consisting of a
homunculus-like, little person in the head, isolated phenomenon
that occurs in brains, to a phenomenon that spans multiple scales
across brain, body, and environment, has consequences for how
the mind sciences conceive of their focus of inquiry. Thus, for
the remainder of this work, I will use “cognition” and “mind”
interchangeably.
RECN distinguishes itself from mainstream cognitive sci-
ence, psychology, and neuroscience in a number of ways. First,
although it is fair to say that all contemporary scientific investi-
gations of the mind are physicalist (materialist, naturalist, etc.),
there is often a residual Cartesian commitment exhibited by
practitioners. Solymosi (2011) refers to this as the “Cartesian
materialism” evident in methodological and theoretical commit-
ments to the brain as identical to mind, or the brain as the
functional locus of mind. There is no doubt that the brain is
essential for most cognitive and behavioral activities. However,
RECN does not treat the brain as the central target of investiga-
tion when researching mind (cf. Van Orden et al. notion of the
“blue-collar brain”; Van Orden et al., 2012).
Second, instead of investigating formal computations acting
over mental representations, or the neural implementation of said
computations and representations, RECN investigates systems.
RECN takes lessons from Gibsonian ecological psychology and
treats cognition as something that systems do. Cognition is not
an all or nothing phenomenon. There are degrees of cognition.
Cognition is something that is realized in organism-environment
systems. Depending on what aspect of cognition one investigates,
the brain may play a more central role in the explanation, but
the body might in another, or, for that matter, the environment
outside the skin, scales, feathers, or fur boundaries of an organ-
ism. Regardless of what part of the system is focused upon in a
particular investigation, all parts of the system are involved. In
RECN, the boundaries of cognition can be given pragmatically
motivated borders in order to facilitate scientific investigation.
The bounds of cognition are not knowable a priori. The bounds
of cognition must fit in a theoretical and methodological frame-
work that gels with the empirical evidence. RECN is “embodied”
in that cognition is not brain-centric, but spans the brain, body,
and environment.
Like its predecessor, RECN utilizes the tools of DST in order
to investigate cognition. DST provides both the terminology and
techniques for modeling changes in systems over time. DST and
its applications to the cognitive, neural, and psychological sci-
ences are not without its challenges. Methodological challenges
include the distinction between dynamical and non-dynamical
models, properly characterizing the variables, and being clear to
distinguish such data as those obtained from the simulation or
model, and those from the empirical data (Gelfand and Engelhart,
2012). Theoretical challenges include the explanatory power of
dynamical models (Kaplan and Bechtel, 2011) and the compati-
bility of DST with such concepts as representation, computation,
and information processing (Eliasmith, 2012). Despite these chal-
lenges, the methods remain powerful and broadly applicable. The
virtues and vices of applying DST to investigations of cognition
have been addressed in great detail elsewhere and go beyond the
scope of the current work (see Haselager et al., 2003; Thelen and
Smith, 2006; Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2010; Stepp et al., 2011;
Silberstein and Chemero, 2013). For a defense of DST in inves-
tigations of cognition, I refer readers to Chemero (2009) and
Thelen and Smith (1994).
Thus far, RECN is mostly indistinguishable from RECS. First,
both are “radical” in their rejection of commitments to mental
computations and representations as necessary theoretical postu-
lates for explaining cognition. Second, both are “embodied” in
their commitment to non-brain-centric treatments of cognition
and the investigation of organism-environment systems. Third,
both have returned to psychology’s Jamesian roots and the investi-
gation of mindedness. Finally, both utilize the tools and methods
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of DST. In the following section, I begin to differentiate RECN
from RECS by describing the “neuroscience” portion of RECN.
THE “NEUROSCIENCE”
Chemero suggests the possibility of a single scientific framework
of the entire brain-body-environment system (2009, p. 153), pos-
sibly comprised of work in the ecological and enactive cognitive
sciences. Though, he cautions that much more work needs to be
done in both of these sciences before they can unite. From this
discussion, it can be supposed that Chemero believes that inves-
tigations of behavior typical to ecological psychologists will not
be enough to fully investigate cognition. On this point, I think he
is right. However, I do not think he is correct about the present
state of the relevant neural sciences. The cognitive, neural, and
psychological sciences are currently poised to comprise a frame-
work for the investigation of brain-body-environment systems. If
unified under the heading of “radical embodied cognitive neu-
roscience,” there is research currently being conducted that could
comprise such a framework, research that will be discussed below.
Like RECS, RECN would apply the methods of DST. However,
RECN would have a different guide to discovery.
To date, DST has been applied in research that spans a variety
of mind-related disciplines. Examples include, but are far from
limited to, research on single neuron activations (e.g., Izhikevich,
2007), neural networks (e.g., Sporns, 2011b), quantifying con-
sciousness (e.g., Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008), and accounts of
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia (e.g., Loh et al., 2007).
Although short, this list motivates the claim that DST has been
successfully applied to phenomena paradigmatically thought of
as causally related to or constitutive of cognition, such as neural
activity and consciousness. The same is true of DST in cognitive
science and psychology. Accordingly, DST is poised to serve as
a shared terminology and methodology across the various cog-
nitive, neural, and psychological sciences. This is why DST is
the chosen methodological framework of the current version of
RECN, and is a major reason why RECN is similar to RECS.
RECN and RECS differ in two major ways though. First, they dif-
fer in terms of the emphasis placed on the role of neural accounts
of cognition. Second, they differ in regard to their main theo-
retical commitment, which in turn informs their main guide to
discovery.
Chemero’s RECS places Gibsonian ecological psychology at
the center of its theoretical commitments, especially Gibson’s les-
son that when investigating cognition, one ought to look at the
organism-environment system and not the organism qua entity
independent from the world. RECS also places affordances in a
prominent position. According to Gibson’s ecological theory of
perception-action (1966/1979, 1973/1983), perception is of affor-
dances. Although there are a number of competing definitions
of the term “affordances” (e.g., Gibson, 1973/1983; Turvey, 1992;
Stoffregen, 2003; Chemero, 2009), it is generally agreed among
ecological psychologists that affordances are “directly perceivable,
environmental opportunities for behavior” (Chemero, 2009, p.
23). These opportunities for behavior are based on properties of
the environment and properties of the animal (Stoffregen, 2003).
The affordance “pass-through-ability,” for example, is based on
the width of the opening of apertures, such as doors, relative to an
organism’s width (Warren and Whang, 1987; Favela et al., 2014).
The investigation of such affordances is central to the ecological
psychologist’s research program, and it is central to RECS as well.
Although both RECS and RECN share in the Gibsonian com-
mitment to the investigation of organism-environment systems,
RECN does not share the commitment to researching affor-
dances. Ecological psychologists tend to research affordances, and
affordances tend to be analyzed at the scale of whole organ-
isms. Although there is no in-principle reason why a theory of
affordances cannot have a significant neural portion (e.g., Cisek,
2007), ecological psychologists do not investigate the brain. For
ecological psychologists, affordances are phenomena that hap-
pen at the intersection of organism-environment interactions.
Nonetheless, neither the ontological nor epistemological status of
affordances is essential to RECN. Thus, RECN can be committed
to the investigation of organism-environment systems without
being committed to a Gibsonian theory of affordances. So, what
role does the brain play in RECN?
RECN includes “neuroscience” in the sense that the brain, as
part of an organism, is essential to understanding the mind as
a systems phenomenon. The affordance guided research of eco-
logical psychology and RECS focus investigations of mind at the
intersection of organism and environment. Thus, an account of
perception-action can be provided at more overt levels of behav-
ior. RECN wants the best of both worlds: RECN treats organism-
environment interactions as essential to explanations of various
capacities and features of mind; and like the neurosciences, RECN
treats the brain and nervous system as essential, both causally and
constitutively, to explanations of various capacities and features
of mind. Science is a human enterprise, and humans are limited
in how much they can understand at a particular moment (cf.
Bechtel and Richardson’s discussion of psychological heuristics in
scientific theorizing; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993/2010). Since
mind spans brain-body-environment, research must be pragmat-
ically motivated in order to get a grip on particular aspects of
the system (cf. Sporns, 2012). In some investigations of mind, an
account at the scale of organism-environment will be appropri-
ate, but for others, the account must include features at the neural
scale. RECN does not emphasize researching affordances because
it has a different guide to discovery, one that does not limit inves-
tigations to the organism-environment scale. RECN utilizes the
theory of SOC as its guide to discovery.
THE THEORY: SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY
In the late 1980s, Bak et al. (1987, 1988) proposed SOC as an
abstract, general theory of the apparent ubiquity of power laws
in nature (Bak et al., 1987, p. 381). Power laws arise near crit-
ical points that are found at second-order phase transitions.
Second-order phase transitions refer to continuous changes at
phase-transition points, where, unlike first-order phase transi-
tions, two phases do not simultaneously exist; there is only one
phase at a point (Bar-Yam, 1997, pp. 87–89). SOC was also postu-
lated as a unifying theory for the many phenomena in nature and
in the laboratory that demonstrate spatial features such as scale
invariance and self-similar structure, as well as temporal dynam-
ics characterized by 1/f signals. Self-organization is appealed to as
an explanation of how and why systems can be near critical states
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in so many conditions and substrates (cf. Song et al., 2005). Self-
organization refers to the state of some nonequilibrium, dynamic
systems to develop structures and patterns of behavior over time
without the control of an external agent or central processor
(Jensen, 1998). A critical state occurs in a system when, on aver-
age, activity of one feature of the system leads to one additional
activity, such as one neuron activating another neuron (Beggs and
Plenz, 2003, p. 11174) or one nuclear fission event leading to one
other fission event (Cutnell and Johnson, 2009, p. 1008). A sub-
critical state occurs when, on average, one activity leads to less
than one subsequent activity. A supercritical state occurs when,
on average, one activity leads to more than one subsequent activ-
ity. Self-organization and criticality make SOC amenable to the
study of complex systems, where “complex” refers to the tendency
of systems to exhibit behavior resulting from many components,
and their interactions to be placed in critical states.
An early example in the SOC literature is the sand pile model
(Bak et al., 1987). Imagine the creation of a pile of sand with
additional grains of sand slowly added. At first, the pile contin-
ues to grow in a cone-like shape. However, after some time, the
pile will be in a critical state whereby an avalanche will occur
and the grains of sand tumble down, widening the base of the
structure and facilitating the ability of the structure to main-
tain a higher center point. If more sand is added to the pile,
then it will continue to grow again until it reaches another crit-
ical state and experiences another avalanche, again widening the
base and allowing the center to be higher. If the slope of the
pile were measured before each avalanche, a scale-free, or power
law distribution will be evident. “Scale-free” refers to statistically,
self-similar structures or patterns at varying spatial or temporal
scales. An important consequence of this feature is that although
the exact location or number of grains of sand that will cause
an avalanche cannot be predicted a priori, the probability that a
particular location and number of grains of sand will cause an
avalanche will be correlated over wide ranges of spatial and tem-
poral scales (Bak et al., 1988, p. 364). That spatial and temporal
properties are correlated over wide ranges is indicative of a “coop-
erative effect” (Bak et al., 1988, p. 364). Such cooperative effects
can be understood as the result of a system’s being self-organized.
Systems are self-organized when there is a reciprocal relation-
ship among local areas and behavior at the global state of the
system (Strogatz, 1994; Kelso, 1995). Moreover, such reciprocal
relationships often display scale-free, self-similar structures.
Fractals are examples of scale-free, self-similar structures
(Mandelbrot, 1977/1983). A fractal is a spatial or temporal struc-
ture whereby the global structure is maintained at various scales
of observation. Examples of fractal spatial structures include
coastlines and mountain ranges, Sierpinksi triangles, tree branch-
ing, and cauliflower. Examples of fractal temporal structures
include finger tapping (Kadota et al., 2004; Kello et al., 2007),
heartbeats (Peng et al., 1995), human gait patterns (Hausdorff
et al., 1995), functional magnetic resonance imaging signal
changes (Lee et al., 2008), and simple reaction time tasks (Van
Orden et al., 2005). The scale-free, self-similar structure of fractals
can be quantified by power laws and captured utilizing a num-
ber of analytic techniques, such as detrended fluctuation analysis
(Ihlen, 2012). If power laws, particularly in the 1/f range, are
revealed in the analyses, then the results can be interpreted to be
indicative of such features as interaction-dominance (Richardson
and Chemero, 2014). Although these analytic methods are still
being developed and refined (e.g., Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010),
and although artificial systems can be created in the lab that
display 1/f power law features (e.g., Wagenmakers et al., 2005),
given the ubiquity of such features in natural systems and the
mounting empirical evidence, it is a reasonable hypothesis that
something along the lines of SOC is responsible for the generation
and maintenance of these spatial and temporal properties.
Since Bak and colleagues first proposed it in the late 1980s,
SOC has been utilized to characterize the behavior of various sys-
tems, such as rice and sand piles (Bak, 1996), earthquakes (Bak
et al., 2002), and the Earth’s magnetosphere (Consolini, 2002).
Various features of brains have demonstrated SOC: Human brain
oscillations (Poil et al., 2008), network connections (Chialvo,
2004; Sporns, 2011b), networks of cortical neurons (Beggs and
Plenz, 2003; Pasquale et al., 2008), and spontaneous cortical activ-
ity in vivo in cats (Hahn et al., 2010) and monkeys (Petermann
et al., 2009). Experimental results also indicate that SOC is a
ubiquitous feature of more overt scales of cognition and behav-
ior: Interpersonal coordination (Coey et al., 2012), mental image
rotation (Gilden, 2001), and stride and gait (Hausdorff et al.,
1995).
Thus far, two facts can be said about SOC. First, self-
organization and criticality regularly occur together in nature.
Second, there is accumulating experimental evidence for SOC in
various systems, especially related to the brain, cognition, and
behavior. If SOC is the guide to discovery for RECN, then how
is it deployed in scientific practice? SOC is deployed in terms of
a particular set of theoretical commitments that guide research.
Popper once noted that:
Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite
task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. And its description
presupposes a descriptive language [. . .], which in its turn presup-
poses interests, points of view, and problems (Popper, 1963/2002,
p. 62).
In line with this view of scientific practice, RECN treats systems
as the chosen object of investigation, with the definite task of
explaining how those systems act. The descriptive language of
RECN is DST and the point of view is from SOC. Consequently,
for the practitioner of RECN, the idea is to look at systems and
to explain their behavior in terms of self-organization and critical
phase transitions.
What counts as a “system” depends on the research question.
What remains the same across various research questions is the
idea that systems do not require an external force to drive their
behaviors. SOC describes the undirected occurrence of critical
dynamics in complex systems ruled by internal interactions (Bak
et al., 1988; Jensen, 1998; Rubinov et al., 2011). The notion of
“critical states,” as evidenced by power law and self-similar spatial
and temporal structures, introduces a third type of behavior for
empirical investigation. As Van Orden et al. (2011) note, before
complexity science, variation in repeatedly measured values was
divided into the categories of regular or random change (p. 640).
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SOC provides a theory for labeling a third category of states that
are neither regular nor random. The sand pile is an example of
a state that is neither regular nor random. As discussed above,
the behavior of the sand pile is not deterministic, but it is statisti-
cally stable. Many nonequilibrium systems can be characterized as
being neither regular nor random (Prigogine and Nicolis, 1977).
Mind is treated as falling into this third category of behavior.
When mind is categorized as a self-organized and critical sys-
tem, it is said to exhibit the following qualities: It spans brain,
body, and environment; it is a self-organized system that is not
directed by either an external or internal controller; and it resides
in nonequilibrium states that are in constant flux and exhibit self-
similar properties at various spatial and temporal scales. When a
system exhibits self-organization and criticality, then it is ordered
enough to maintain structure, but disordered enough so as to
be adaptable to spatial and temporal changes. The mind exhibits
these properties. Accordingly, the mind can be labeled under the
SOC class of systems.
Unlike Gibsonian affordances, which are typically utilized in
the study of organism-environment interactions, the theory of
SOC can span investigations across varying scales of investiga-
tion. The broad applicability and mounting empirical evidence
are why SOC, and not affordances, is RECN’s guide to discov-
ery. SOC provides a theoretical foundation fromwhich to observe
and explain phenomena that can be overlooked by other theoret-
ical frameworks, including self-organization and behavior that is
neither regular nor random. In the following section, I present a
proof of concept to demonstrate the feasibility of applying DST
as a unifying methodology and SOC as a productive guide to dis-
covery across various scales of investigations between the mind
sciences.
PROOF OF CONCEPT
Many of the theories and methods discussed thus far have uti-
lized DST. Although relatively new to the mind sciences, DST
has an ever-growing track record of successful applications to the
analysis of cognition and behavior. There remains debate as to
the degree to which these methods can augment or replace more
traditional methods in the cognitive, neural, and psychological
sciences (e.g., Van Orden et al., 2003, 2005; Wagenmakers et al.,
2005; Gray, 2012). This is not the debate I wish to enter here.
I have discussed DST and its successes in order to support my
claim that RECN can be a unifying framework across the mind
sciences. What follows is an early attempt at a proof of concept
for the application of DST and SOC across multiple scales in the
mind sciences. I will attempt to start at the scale of single neurons
and work my way up to interactions among body and world.
The basic treatment of individual neurons has been to con-
ceive of them as on/off switches; they either fire or they don’t.
During the last decade or so, neurons and synapses have come to
be understood as complex systems unto themselves (Izhikevich,
2007; Choquet and Triller, 2013; Wilhelm et al., 2014). The first
part of my proof of concept is Izhikevich’s (2010, p. 5067) model
of individual synaptic activity:
Isynaptic(t) =
∑
i
gi(t)(Ei − v)
This equation is a model of synaptic activity, where I represents
the sum of all input currents, including biological features such as
time-varying conductance (gi(t)) and molecular chemical activ-
ity (i = NMDA, AMPA, GABAA, and GABAB). The above model
is biologically realistic, meaning that it captures the activity of
real synapses. Similar models of synaptic activity have explicitly
demonstrated the success of utilizing SOC as a guide to discovery.
Levina et al. (2007) demonstrated that by inputting biologically
realistic parameters in another model of dynamical synapses in
a spiking neural network, neuronal avalanches went from being
occasionally observed to being typical behavior of the network
indicative of self-organized critical behavior. In short, Levina and
colleagues demonstrated that synaptic activity plays a crucial role
in generating self-organized and critical behavior in biologically
realistic neural networks.
The above model of synaptic activity can be nested within a
model of single neurons (Izhikevich, 2010, p. 5063):
Cv˙ = k (v − vrest) (v − vthresh)− u+ I
and
u˙ = a[b (v − vrest)− u]
This simple model of spiking neurons (Cv˙), along with a recov-
ery variable (u˙), captures such features as voltage resting (vrest)
and threshold (vthresh) states. The previous set of equations can be
simplified into a more general form as follows (Izhikevich, 2010,
p. 5068):
v˙ = f (v, u)+ g(t) [E(t)− v]+ I
This model of neuron firing incorporates the synaptic term (I),
such that all of the activity in the model of individual synaptic
activity is nested within the model of single neuron activity. If, for
example, all of the various molecular chemical activity involved in
synaptic activity (e.g., NMDA, AMPA, GABAA, and GABAB) were
not discovered yet, a biologically realistic model of single neuron
activity could still be developed, with I still based on empirically
obtained data, namely, recordings of synaptic activity. Now that
the molecular chemical properties of synapses are known, the I
term can be zoomed in on for more detailed information. Were
the “details” of the I term not known, would it be said that the
general model of single neuron firing was not a justified model
of single neuron activations? Unless an investigator is a “smallest”
and has a priori commitments to the notion that explanations are
only had at a particular scale of investigation such as the molec-
ular, then the general model of single neuron firing ought to be
considered a justifiable explanation. The complexity of synapses
(Wilhelm et al., 2014) can be captured by a single parameter in a
model of a higher scale phenomenon such as single neurons. The
same holds true as we scale up.
The next step of my proof of concept is to demonstrate that
models of single neuron firing (v˙) can be nested within models of
networks of neurons. Izhikevich and Edelman (2008) simulated
the behavior of total synaptic connections within the mam-
malian thalamocortical system. In the current model, each neu-
ron is treated as a “compartment” that is connected to numerous
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other “compartments.” The model for total synaptic activity at
each compartment is as follows (Izhikevich and Edelman, 2008,
supporting information appendix, p. 11):
Isyn = gAMPA(v − 0)+ gNMDA [(v + 80)/60]
2
1+ [(v + 80)60]2 (v − 0)
+ gGABAA(v + 70)+ gGABAB(v + 90)+ Igap
The model above contains the v term from the previous
equation. The model of compartment activity and their rela-
tionships, as captured by simulated fMRI/BOLD signals, can
be captured by the single term y˙ (Izhikevich and Edelman,
2008, supporting information appendix, p. 12). Thus, the
sum of all synaptic activity of all neurons within a voxel is
modeled as:
y˙ = (Isyn(z))− y/500
This model is adapted from Izhikevich and Edelman (2008) and
altered to explicitly include the Isyn term that itself incorpo-
rated the activity of the model of neuro firing captured by the
v˙ term in Izhikevich (2010). The z term refers to the number of
compartments calculated. The remainder of the model remains
unaltered.
Adapted from neuron models by Morrison and colleagues
(Morrison et al., 2007), Rubinov et al. (2011) developed a model
of network connections that exhibited SOC. Rubinov and col-
leagues found the presence of self-organized critical dynamics
in their neurobiologically realistic hierarchically modular net-
works of integrate-and-fire neurons (such as those modeled by
Izhikevich, 2010). Their network model is as follows (Rubinov
et al., 2011, supplementary information, p. 3):
C
dV
dt
= Cdy1
dt
= −gy1 + y2 − y3
This model describes the integration of synaptic currents across
all neural activity in a given area. In this model, y1 is equiv-
alent to y˙ in the previous model of synaptic activity within a
voxel. The other terms depict such features as membrane conduc-
tance (g), the timing of previous spikes (t), and experimentally
obtained parameter values (V). For more information on the
parameter values see Table 1 in Rubinov et al. (2011). This
equation, along with the definitions of y2 and y3 (see Rubinov
et al., 2011, supplemental text 1, p. 3), can be restated in matrix
form:
dy
dt
= Ay =
⎡
⎣
−g/C 1/C −1/C
0 −1/t1 0
0 −1/t2
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣
y1
y2
y3
⎤
⎦
Network activity can then be analyzed via connectivity matrices
(Rubinov et al., 2011, pp. 2–6). Once network connections have
reached this stage of modeling, it is then possible, in principle,
to begin to couple groups of networks of neurons within a single
brain, or neural activity between individuals. The following is an
idealizedmodel of two sets of networks, coupled in two dynamical
equations that cannot be solved separately (inspired by Kelso and
Tognoli, 2007, p. 52):
dy
dt
= Ay =
⎡
⎢⎣
− gC 1C − 1C
0 − 1t1 0
0 − 1t2
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎣
y1
y2
y3
⎤
⎦ (y − x)
and
dx
dt
= Ax =
⎡
⎢⎣
− gC 1C − 1C
0 − 1t1 0
0 − 1t2
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎣
x1
x2
x3
⎤
⎦ (x − y)
The reason these two equations cannot be solved separately is that
they each contain parameters present within the other equation.
Thus, any changes to y in the above equation will affect the below
equation, and any changes to x in the below equation will affect
the top equation. Epistemologically speaking, each equation can
be treated as referring to entities independent of each other (e.g.,
two networks in one brain, two people having a conversation,
etc.). However, from a systems perspective, because a change in
one part of the system has causal and constitutive consequences
for the other, the entities are ontologically a single system.
This sort of approach to explaining phenomena via sets of
dynamical systems equations has also been used to understand
animal-environment systems (see Beer, 1995; Chemero, 2009).
Beer presented the following set of equations to model animal-
environment systems (1995, p. 181):
X˙A = A (XA; S (XE))
X˙E = E (XE;M (XA))
As discussed above, such sets of dynamical systems equations
allow us to model systems and capture the interrelated nature of
the parameters. In Beer’s example, a change in S (sensory input to
the animal) will affect M (motor output), which will reciprocally
affect S, and so on. Attempts are currently underway to model
social interactions in a similar manner as the previous two sets of
equations (e.g., Kelso et al., 2009; Dumas et al., 2010).
This section has been an attempt at proof of concept of
RECN as an explanatory framework for the mind sciences. First,
I have attempted to demonstrate the potential power of RECN
to account for brain activity, cognition, and behavior by provid-
ing examples of research guided by the theory of SOC. Second, I
have attempted to demonstrate that DSTmodeling can be used to
capture SOC across multiple scales. A significant feature of DST
modeling that I have drawn attention to is its nesting capacity.
Synaptic activity can be “collapsed” into a single parameter, while
maintaining biological realism, and embedding that parameter
into a model of single neuron firing. Next, I demonstrated that
neuron firing can itself be collapsed into a single parameter and
embedded into models with varying purposes, such as captur-
ing activity within a wide range of voxels and across networks.
The examples to this point are empirically validated, with results
explicitly guided by the theory of SOC (i.e., Levina et al., 2007;
Rubinov et al., 2011).
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Unlike the preceding steps, which have been validated by
published experimental results, the next step of my proof of
concept is speculative. Motivated by the ability to nest activ-
ities at one scale within parameters of models at another
scale, and inspired by previous work on systems modeling
(e.g., Beer, 1995; Kelso and Tognoli, 2007), I present an ideal-
ized model of coupled brain regions. It is in principle possi-
ble that the same sets of commitments to the theory of SOC
and the methodology of DST can guide research at higher
scales (e.g., macroscale brain networks, social interaction, etc.).
Following this proof of concept, in the next section I explain
how RECN can address the data deluge challenge facing the mind
sciences.
ADDRESSING THE GRAND CHALLENGES
If investigations of mind span brain, body, and environment, then
the “grand challenges” (He et al., 2013) facing neuroscience are
applicable to the other mind sciences as well. Since the goal of
RECN is to connect investigations of mind at all scales, including
the neural, then it must also meet these grand challenges. RECN
currently has the methods and theory to address these challenges.
The first grand challenge is to develop a common theoretical lan-
guage for describing cognition and behavior acrossmultiple scales
of inquiry. The terminology and tools of DST can meet this chal-
lenge. A number of mind sciences have already been utilizing
DST across various scales of inquiry: Cognitive science (e.g., Beer,
1995; Hausdorff, 2007; Chemero, 2009, 2013), neuroscience (e.g.,
Izhikevich, 2007; Loh et al., 2007; Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008),
and psychology (e.g., Smith and Thelen, 2003; Van Orden et al.,
2003, 2005; Ramos et al., 2011). DST’s broad range of success-
ful applications in the mind sciences motivates the claim that it
is able to serve as a shared methodology. With a methodology in
place, SOC can serve as a common theoretical perspective. As with
DST, there is mounting evidence for the application of SOC as a
theoretical perspective for the mind sciences across scales: Single
neurons (e.g., Levina et al., 2007), meso- and macroscopic brain
networks (e.g., Rubinov et al., 2011), and social behaviors (e.g.,
Ramos et al., 2011). Given the successful and wide-ranging appli-
cation of DST and SOC in the mind sciences, it is possible that
the first grand challenge is met. However, it can be argued that
there is nothing special about DST or SOC, that is, there are other
methodological and theoretical approaches that can do this work
as well.
There are many thorny philosophical issues surrounding what
the criteria are for the “best” scientific methods and theories.
Those issues go far beyond the scope of the current work. It is
true that other methods can be applied across the mind sciences.
Pluralism is often a good thing (Chemero and Silberstein, 2008;
Dale, 2008; Dale et al., 2009). In terms of addressing the two spe-
cific grand challenges facing the mind sciences, as long as the
methods facilitate the application of a theory that gels with the
empirical data, there is reason to be persuaded to apply RECN.
RECN is a viable option for addressing the first grand challenge
because the methods facilitate empirically justified applications
of its theory. The more compelling reason, however, for utilizing
RECN as a framework is its ability to address the second grand
challenge.
The second grand challenge is to reduce big data to small
data, or, to make the enormous amounts of data produced by
the cognitive, neural, and psychological sciences comprehensible
within and between fields. Another way of putting the challenge
of reducing big data to small data is by asking the following ques-
tion: How do we explain how enormous groups of interconnected
neurons, brain networks, and social and environmental interac-
tions produce wide repertoires of behaviors? Part of an answer lies
in having a theory for interpreting and conceptualizing research
data. SOC is theoretically and conceptually able to provide an
explanation for how enormous groups of interconnected neu-
rons, brain networks, and social and environment interactions
produce wide repertoires of behaviors: Large numbers of highly,
(often nonlinearly) connected parts can self-organize and give rise
to behaviors interconnected with the local areas and global state
of the system. These self-organized systems can be poised at crit-
ical states, thereby facilitating stability and instability, which are
necessary for systems to be able to adapt to changes at the local
and global levels of interaction. DST methods are able to capture
these systems-based features.
As demonstrated above in the proof of concept, the ability
to collapse large amounts of information into single parame-
ters, while preserving biologically real facts, and embedding those
parameters within models at various scales is part of what makes
DST an especially powerful set of tools for the mind sciences.
Although collapsing large amounts of information into single
parameters may facilitate more readily understood explanations,
a number of challenges arise with this method and systems-
based approaches in general. By treating cognition and behavior
as realized across multiple scales within a system, RECN is able
to nest parameters and focus on one scale at a time. Scales
are pragmatically delineated and examined based on particu-
lar research questions and from particular theoretical points of
view (cf. Popper, 1963/2002). If no single scale occupies a privi-
leged position, then researchers are faced with what Sporns calls
the “parcellation problem” of identifying meaningful functional
units (2012, p. 44). A tension arises between maintaining biolog-
ical realism while facilitating explanations and understanding of
complex systems phenomena (Favela, 2014).
Non-systems-based approaches to themind sciences have been
motivated by what Sporns refers to as the “Laplacian dream”
(2012, p. 168). The Laplacian dream is the idea that explanations
in the mind sciences are only had when activities can be fully
predictable based on brute force, bottom-up strategies to cap-
ture the “positions and velocities” of every neuron and synapse.
If the goal of the mind sciences is to understand the mind, then
the “Laplacian approach” is the incorrect one to follow:
The point of building brain [mind, cognition, behavior, etc.]
models. . . is to advance understanding of brain [mind, cognition,
behavior, etc.] function, not creating in silico replicas that are as
complex and incomprehensible as the real thing (Sporns, 2012,
p. 168).
If understanding is the goal of the mind sciences, and if the mind
is a multiscale systems phenomenon, then it is inevitable that
models will be utilized to facilitate dimension reduction. With
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parameter reduction, “processes at smaller scales become part
of compact descriptions of regularities at larger scales” (Sporns,
2012, p. 168). So, if the mind sciences are committed to the
notions of no single privileged scale, and the goal is to understand
the mind, then nested parameters in DST models are an excellent
option.
Although a single neuron receives inputs via molecular
exchanges at its synapses, a brain network receives input from
countless neuronal connections, and a single organism receives
innumerable environmental input, investigations at each scale
need not produce explanations that include specific information
from every other scale. DST provides accounts of phenomena in
the form of models. These models have the power to maintain
such explanatory virtues as control, prediction, and simplicity
while providing accounts of systems with many degrees of free-
dom with simple models that eliminate the irrelevant degrees of
freedom of that system in relation to the target of inquiry (cf.
Batterman, 1998). Without dimension reduction, explanations
of complex systems phenomena run the risk of considering too
many factors relevant (cf. Lewis, 2000; Strevens, 2009) that can
result in incomprehensible accounts.
RECN strives for models all the way down; as well as all the
way up and side-to-side, for that matter. In other words, a model
of a cognitive activity ought to, in principle, be able to allow a
researcher to zoom in on each parameter. This is because neuron
models are nested within brain network model parameters, which
are in turn nested within models of the body, and within mod-
els of the organism-environment interactions. In this way, “Big
Data” becomes “Small Data” in light of the capacity of models to
be nested and to incorporate behavior relevant parameters.
CONCLUSION
The fact that it is becoming more accepted that investigations of
mind span the brain, body, and environment means that scien-
tists must reckon with large amounts of data. RECN is a scientific
framework for investigating the mind as a phenomenon that
spans brain, body, and environment. RECN is inspired by RECS.
Like RECS, RECN utilizes the methods of DST. Although not
opposed to it, RECN is not committed to Gibsonian ecological
psychology and the investigation of affordances as its theoreti-
cal basis. Instead, RECN is committed to the theory of SOC. The
main reason for this difference is that RECN attempts to incorpo-
rate brain research whereas ecological psychologists do not. There
is already evidence that the theory of SOC is applicable to neural,
bodily, and social systems.
The methods of DST and the theory of SOC provide answers
to the NSF’s data deluge grand challenges. As a descriptive term
for particular kinds of systems, SOC is broad enough (synapses,
neurons, networks, etc.) but focused enough (systems that are
self-organized, exhibit scale-free and self-similar properties, and
exist in states that are neither regular nor random) to be useful.
DST is scale-neutral and applicable to broad ranges of phe-
nomena through modeling. These models have the capacity to
facilitate dimension reduction. A consequence of this capacity is
the ability to nest parameters within other models, depending
on the target of investigation. For example, although a model of
a neuron includes a number of parameters, when investigating
brain networks, those parameters are causally unimportant to the
network model, which treats the neuron as a single parameter
itself. Details become nested within parameters without losing
explanatory virtues such as control and predictability. In this way,
the grand challenge of reducing big data to small data is met.
Moreover, the grand challenges are met while preserving com-
prehensibility of complex systems phenomena without conceding
biological realism.
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